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ABSTRACT
This paper shows the non-optimality of the free trade policy in a labor-surplus
economy where multinational corporations operate in the importable sector with distortions in
the capital market. It then examines the welfare implications of alternative trade intervention
policies. The paper illustrates that (a) a tariff and a production subsidy to the importable
sector reduce welfare, while (b) an export subsidy and a production subsidy to the exportable
sector enhance welfare. The optimum subsidy rates necessary to implement the outwardlooking trade policy are also derived in the paper.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a remarkable growth in the literature on the economics
of multinational corporations. The international attributes of the global firms and their
implications for resource allocation and movement of capital across national borders have
been examined in terms of the traditional trade models in Caves [1971] Batra and
Ramachandran [1980], Koizumi and Kopecky [1977], Mansfield [1980], Root [1990] Stopford
and Dunning [1983], Blomstrom and Persson [1983]. Lately, Batra (1986) has formulated a
general equilibrium model to show the effects of the entry and subsequent expansion of
multinational firms in a labor-surplus economy on employment and national income. This
paper evaluates the welfare implications of alternative trade policies in the presence of
multinationals in a less developed country where unemployment exists because of the
downward rigidity of the real wage rate. The general equilibrium framework utilized by
Batra is used in the analysis of this paper.
A labor-surplus economy is plagued by large-scale general unemployment. In this
situation, the multinational firms introduce a highly capital-intensive superior technology
embodied in a specific factor owned by them and compete with the national firms for capital
in the local market. 1 The banking practices in the LDCs favor the global firms with interest
rates lower than those paid by national firms. The capital-market distortion caused by the
infiltration of multinationals is added to the already existing labor-market distortion. In the
presence of these distortions in the domestic economy, the free-trade policy is not optimal and
hence for the country trade intervention is needed. This paper explores the effects of various
alternative trade intervention policies in this context.
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The layout of the paper is as follows: Section II sets up the model. Section III
provides the equilibrium solution for the endogenous variables in the model and shows the
non-optimality of the free trade policy. Then Sections IV and V deal with interventions in the
importable sector in the form of export subsidy and production subsidy. Similar interventions
in the exportable sector in the form of export subsidy and production subsidy are considered
in Sections VI and VII. Section VIII summarizes the main conclusions of the study. The
mathematical derivations used in the text are put into two appendices.

II. SPECIFICATION OF TIlE MODEL
The model represents a labor-surplus host economy with two sectors of production,
where multinational firms operate in the importable industry and local firms are concentrated
in the exportable production. Capital and labor are the two local factors that are employed in
both industries. The multinationals bring a special factor in the host economy in the form of
managerial and technical know-how, which is specific to the importable sector. There is
large scale unemployment of labor in the economy due to the downward inflexibility of
wages. Though capital is fully employed in the two sectors of production, there exists a
distortion in the capital market in that the multinationals employ capital at a lower rental rate
than that of the local fums. Perfect competition exists in other markets of the economy.
Let X and Y be the output quantities of the importable and exportable sectors,
respectively. The two production functions in the economy are
(1)

and,
2

y

=

Y (K, '

L),

(2)

where K stands for capital, L for labor, S for the specific factor brought by the
multinationals, and the subscripts x and y for the two sectors, importable and exportable,
respectively. Both production functions exhibit constant returns to scale and diminishing
marginal product of each factor. In addition, the production functions are concave and have
positive cross partial derivatives with the following properties: 3

-

The stock of capital in the economy is fixed at K so that [Kx + Ky]

=

-

K. The

-

multinationals have brought a fixed amount of the specific factor, S, which they continue to
maintain in the economy. The employment of labor, L

=

[Lx

+

Ly] , depends on the demand

for labor in the two sectors, because its supply is unlimited in the Lewis sense. 3
Let P be the relative price of the importable in terms of the exportable, which is
treated as the numeraire in the model. Because of the distortion in the capital market, the
value of the marginal product of capital in the importable sector is less than that in the
exportable. Then the employment of capital in the two sectors will satisfy the following
equilibrium conditions:
(3)

where Xx and Yx are the marginal products of capital in X and Y production, respectively,
and « > 1 is a parameter that represents the link between the rental rates of capital in the
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two sectors. It should be noted that commercial banks and other financial institutions may
prefer to charge the mulitnational corporations lower interest rates, so that rx < r, ' however
because of the intersectoral mobility of capital, there exist some link between the cost of
capital in the two sectors, hence « rx

=

r, with ex > 1.

The institutionally determined wage rate in terms of the exportable is fixed at W. The
given wage rate is equated to the value of the marginal product of labor in the two sectors by
the appropriate hiring of labor. Then the equilibrium conditions for the labor market are,
PXL

=

W

(4)

W

(5)

and,

yL
where

XL

=

and YL are the marginal products of labor in X and Y production, respectively.

The rental rate of the specific factor is determined by the value of its marginal product
in the importable sector, so that,
(6)

where p is the rental rate of the specific factor and Xs its marginal product in X production.
Full employment of capital and the specific factor yields the following two equations:
(7)

and,

4

where kx = ( Kx

-

(8)

sL,

=

St

I Lx)' k, = ( K, I L) and

s

= ( S I L, ) .

The production structure of the economy is completely described by equations (1)
through (8) The consumption side of the model is specified by the following strictly concave
social utility function:
U = U (Dx

t

D, )

(9)

t

where U is the utility level and Dx and D, are the consumption of the importable and
exportable, respectively. In order to determine the domestic consumption bundle, the utility
function in equation (9) is maximized, subject to the domestic income constraint:

-

(10)

PDx + D, = PX + Y - pSt
where p

=

-

X8 and X8 is the marginal product of the specific factor so that, pS is the rental

of the specific factor, appropriated by the multinationals and repatriated to the countries of
their affiliation. The left-hand side of equation (10) is the value of the domestic consumption
and its right-hand side is the Net National Product. The following marginal condition
determines the consumption equilibrium in the economy:
(11)

where U x and Uy are the marginal utilities of the consumption of the importable and
exportable, respectively.
In an open economy, the domestic consumption plan is made consistent with the
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domestic production plan through exports and imports. Let By be the export of Y and Ex be
the export of X. Then net export and import quantities are,

EJ

= [

Y - Dy ]

(12)

and,
(13)

The income constraint in equation (10) yields the following trade balance equation:
(14)

where the exports net of the rental of the specific factor, taken out of the country by the
where the exports net of the rental of the specific of the factor, taken out of the country by
the multinational corporations,s pay for the imports.

ill. EQUILmRIUM SOLUTION AND FREE TRADE

In order to generate a set of determinate solutions for the endogenous variables in the
model, it is assumed that the host country is a small open economy. Under this assumption,
the domestic producers and consumers in the economy face a given relative price of the
importable, P, which under free trade is equal to the international price, p •.
The production structure of the economy, specified in equations (1) through (8), can
be solved for X, Y, Kx' KJ , Lx' LJ , s and p in terms of K, S, P, W and a. The step-wise
solution for the variables is described below. First, since the production functions in
equations (1) and (2) are linearly homogeneous, the marginal productivity conditions in
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equations (3), (4), and (5) can be solved for kx, ky and s, when P, W and a are given
exogenously. Second, once

kx, ky,

-

and s are known in the first-step equations (7) and (8) can

-

be solved for Lx and Ly, since K and S are given. Thus, when Lx and Ly are known the
second step, the definitional equations, kx = ( Kx / Lx ) and kJ

= (

KJ

/

LJ

) ,

can be used

to determine Kx and Ky, since kx and ky are already known.
Finally, p is determined by equation (6) and the output quantities are determined by
equations (1) and (2), when the factor employments are known in the respective equations.
The consumption bundle of the economy along with its trade pattern is determined by
equations (10) through (13). Equations (10) and (11) determine Dx and DJ since X, Y, and

-

p have already been determined and P and S are exogenously given. Then Ey and Ex
are determined by equations (12) and (13).
In order to evaluate the optimality of the free trade policy, a distortion in the domestic
price of the importable is introduced so that P is different from p.. A change in social
welfare is

rep~esented

by the differential of U in equation (9). Then total differentiation of

equation (9) and substitution from the consumption equilibrium condition yield the following
expression for the change in social welfare:
(15)

(dU/UJ ) = [PDx + dDJ }

It may be noted that in a small open economy, trade occurs at the international price,

p.. Then the total differential of the trade balance equation, EJ = [p. Ex

7

+

pS] , is

dE,

=

P ·dEz

dDz = [dEz
where

+

•

From equations (12) and (13), it follows that dD, = [ dy - dE, ] and

dX]. It is shown in Appendix A that [dY

+

PdX ] =[ WdL

'x is the rate of rental of capital in the importable sector.

+ r z {l-ex)

dKz ]

,

Now, successive

substitution of these results in equa~on (15) finally yields, 6
(16)

The change in welfare shown in equation (16) can be used to examine the effects of
alternative trade policies. When welfare is maximized, dU

= O.

Under free trade, P

= p.,

and then the first term in the right-hand side of equation (16) is zero, but the sum of the other
two terms is now necessarily equal to zero. Then free trade is not the optimum policy in a
labor-surplus economy where the presence of multinationals in the importable sector creates
another distortion in the capital market. Since ex > 1, a decrease in Kz and an increase in L
will make the sum of the last two terms in equation (16) positive. Thus a deviation from the
free trade situation, leading to an increase in the employment of labor in the economy and a
decrease in the employment of capital in the importable will improve the level of welfare in
the domestic economy. Welfare implications of alternative trade policies are examined in the
following sections.

IV. TARIFF ON IMPORTS
If the host country imposes a tariff at rate t on its imports, the domestic price of the
importable, faced by both producers and consumers, changes to P
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=

(1 +t)p·. Then

( P - p. )

=

tp· and dt

= (

dPlp· ). Using these results in equation (16), the change in

welfare with respect to the tariff can be written as,

dUldt)
( U,

=

P

·[w dP
dL

+ r (I-ex) dKx ]
x

(17)

dP

where t = 0, initially. Equation (17) gives a measure of the welfare change caused by the
imposition of a small tariff in a free-trade situation. Since the tariff leads to an increase in
the relative price of the importable in the domestic economy, the domestic production of the
importable increases. Then capital is drawn from the exportable sector to the importable one.
It is shown in Appendix B that ( dKx

I dP )

> O. Since ex > 1, the second term in the right

hand side of equation (17) is negative in sign. The expansion of the importable sector causes
an increase in the employment of labor in that sector, but the consequent contraction of the
exportable sector, caused by the transfer of capital, leads to a fall in labor employment in
exportable production. The net effect on the employment of labor depends· on the capitallabor ratios of the two sectors and the elasticities of the marginal products of labor and capital
with respect to the specific factor in the importable sector. The sufficient conditions for the
negative sign of (dL/dP) are derived in Appendix B. As shown in Appendix B, if the capitallabor ratio in the importable sector is higher than that in the exportable sector, and if the
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in importable production with respect to the
specific factor is greater than or equal to that of the marginal product of capital, the total
employment will ambiguously decline with the increase in the relative price of the
importable.7 Then the first term on the right-hand side of equation (17) is also negative in
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sign. Thus it follows that the trade intervention in the form of a tariff cannot improve the
level of domestic welfare. An inward looking trade policy will lead to a negative welfare
change.

v.

PRODUCTION SUBSIDY ON IMPORTABLE
If the production in the importable sector is subsidized by the government at the rate

sx' the relative price of the importable, faced by the producers, will increase to

Ps

=

P ·(1 +sx) , while the consumers will face the same international price, p.. Then

(P - p.) = (Ps

-

p.)

= sx p. and dsx

= (

dPs

/

p. ). Since the price faced by the

consumers does not change, the consumption will not change, and

SG ,

dEx

=

-dX. Using

these results in equation (16), the change in welfare with respect to the rate of subsidy can be
expressed as,

dU/ds)
_
_
x = p {dL
W( U
dP

dK + r(l-cx)-X
~

J

where dPs

= dP. If initially

Sz

x

dP

sdX]
-

xdP'

= 0, the welfare change caused by a small subsidy is

captured by the first two terms in the right-hand side of equation (18). Thus production
subsidy to the importable sector will reduce the domestic welfare level. So, import
substitution is welfare-reducing in its effect.

VI. EXPORT SUBSIDY
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(18)

If the exports of the country are subsidized, the relative price the importable, faced by
the domestic producers and consumers, will go down. Let e be the rate of export subsidy.
Then p.

=

P(l +e), (P - p.)

=

-eP, and de

=

-(1 +e)dPIP. Using these results in

equation (16), the welfare change with respect to the export subsidy can be written as

dUlde) = ~[ep dEx
( U,
1 +e
dP

_

W dL - r (I-a) dKx ].
dP
x
dP

(19)

If the export subsidy is initially zero, the welfare change is captured by the last two terms in
the right hand side of equation (19). As noted earlier, (dKx / dP) > 0 and (dL / dP) > O.
Then the welfare change is positive in sign. Thus the introduction of an export subsidy leads
to an unambiguous welfare gain in the domestic economy. The production of the exportable,
encouraged by the export subsidy, draws capital from the importable sector. The capital
transfer partially corrects the capital-market distortion that exists in the economy. At the
same time, the increase in the employment of labor leads to an increase in domestic income.
The correction of the capital-market distortion and the increase in labor employment are the
two sources Of the welfare gain in the economy.
The optimum rate of export subsidy can be derived from equation (19) by setting its
right-hand side equal to zero and then solving for e. The optimum export subsidy rate, e·, is
then expressed as,

e• = (

1

1
X -dL + X I-a -dKx ]
dEx I dP L dP
,.{
) dP
11

(20)

.

Since ( dEz

I dP )

> 0, if the importable is not an inferior good in consumption, and

( dL I dP ) < 0, (dKz I dP ) > 0 and ex > 1, it is clear from equation (20) that there
exists a positive export subsidy rate, e·, at which the level of domestic welfare is maximized.
The export subsidy, however, creates a consumption distortion in the economy,
because the relative price faced by the consumers is also changed. The consumption
distortion caused by the export subsidy can be avoided by a production subsidy on the
exportable. This policy intervention is considered in the next section.

Vil. PRODUCTION SUBSIDY ON EXPORTABLE
If the production in the exportable sector is subsidized by the government, the relative
price faced by the producers will change, but the consumers will continue to face the same
interna~onal

price as before. Let

s,

be the rate of production subsidy granted to the

exportable sector. Then the relative price faced by the producers is p$ = [ p.

Now, ( P - p. ) = ( p$ - p. ) = -sl'$ and ds, = [ -(1 +s,)dP$
no change in consumption, dEz

= -dX.

I p$] •

I ( 1 +Sy)] .
Since there is

Using these results in equation (16), the change in

welfare with respect to the production subsidy can be written as,

(

dUlds)
_--:.oJ

UJ

=

P [S P -dX + WdL + r (1-ex) _
dK]
z
1+s y $ dP
dP
z
dP

-_$_

y
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(21)

where dP&

=

dP. Again, if the production subsidy is initially zero, the welfare change is

determined by the last two terms in the right-hand side of equation (20). As noted earlier,
this expression is unambiguously positive in sign. Thus the production subsidy on the
exportable sector leads to a welfare gain for the reason mentioned in Section VI.
In the same way as in Section VI, the optimum rate of the production subsidy can be
derived from equation (21) by setting its right-hand side equal to zero and then solving for
Sy. The optimum production subsidy rate, Sy. is then expressed as,

s•
J

=

(

1

1
X -dL + X I-ex -dKx ]
dX/dP L dP
Jc{
) dP •

Again, it is clear from equation (22) that there exists a positive production subsidy rate, Sy.,
at which the domestic welfare level is maximized.

Vill. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two-sector general equilibrium model of this paper shows that the free trade
policy is not optimum in a labor-surplus economy where the capital market is distorted in
favor of the multinationals operating in the importable sector. Import restricting policies of
many less developed countries, their cheap labor and favorable tax policies have attracted
multinationals firms in the importable sectors of these economies. The multinationals employ
their specific factors in the form of superior technology and managerial know-how. They,
however, bring very little general capital in the form of direct foreign investment. The
uncertainty about expropriation in the future might be the reason behind their reluctance to
direct capital investment. Instead, they raise capital from the local market through their
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subsidiaries in competition with the local firms. In this venture, the multinationals are
favored by lower interest rates than those faced by the local firms. Their superior technology
is more capital-intensive than that of the local firms. The technological superiority embodied
in the specific factor is more labor-saving than capital-saving.
In this situation, free trade is not the best policy for the host country. However, trade
intervention in the form of a tariff and a production subsidy to the importable sector will lead
to a further deterioration of the level of domestic welfare. Such policies will aggravate the
employment condition and accentuate the capital market distortion. A better policy
intervention is in the form of export subsidy and production subsidy to the exportable sector.
These policies will generate welfare gains through the correction of capital market distortion
and the increase in the employment of labor. A subsidy to the exportable production ,
however, is better than export subsidy, since it does not create the consumption distortion that
is caused by the latter. A comparison of the results in Sections IV and V with those in
Sections VI and VII clearly shows that the outward looking trade policy leading to the
increase in trade at the fixed price international promotes domestic welfare.
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APPENDIX A
Total differentiation of the production functions in equations (1) and (2) of Section II
yields the following equations:
(A.l)

and,
(A.2)

respectively, since dS

= O.

As dKy = -dKx and dLy = dL - dLx ' equation (A.2) becomes
(A.3)

Then substitution from equations (3), (4), and (5) of Section II in equation (A.3) yields

dY = -a.PXgdKx - PXLdLx
= - P(X~Kx +

+

XLdLJ +

WdL
(A.4)
(l-a.)PX~Kx +

WdL

Using equation (A. 1) and writing 'x = PXK' equation (A.4) can be written as,

elY = -PdX + 'x(l-a.)dKx + WdL,

(A.5)

which gives the expression,

elY

+

PdX

=

rx(l-a.)dKx

+

WdL

Equation (A.6) has been used to replace dY + PdX in equation (16) of Section II.
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(A.6)

APPENDIX B

The marginal productivity conditions in equations (3), (4), and (5) of Section II are
written as,

-

-

(B.1)

= W,

(B.2)

w,

(B.3)

aPXg(Lx,Kx'S) - Yg(Ly,K, - K) = 0,

-

PXL(Lx,Kx'S)

and,

-

YL(Ly,K-K)

-

=

-

where a, P, W, S, and K are exogenously given and Lx' Kx'

and Ly are endogenous

variables. In order to examine the effects of a parametric change in P on the endogenous
variables, equations (B. I) (B.2) and (B.3) are totally differentiated with to P and the results
are written in the following matrix form:

-YXL

dLx I dP

o

dKxldP
dly

/

dP

-aXK

=

-XL

(B.4)

o

Equations in (B.4) are solved for,
(B.5)

(B.6)

and,
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(B.7)

where D = -cxp2yU [XuXu -

(xiv] > O.

It may be noted that,

and ( dKx I dP ) > O.

( dLx I dP ) > 0, ( dLy I dP ) < 0

The effect of a change in P on the total employment of labor is given by ,

(dL I dp)

=

[dLx I dP

+

dLy I dP]
(B.8)

= cxPID [Yu(XLXU

-

XgXxJ + Yn(XgXu - XLXnJ}

The sign of the expression in the right-hand side of equation (B.8) can be evaluated by using
the following results:
(B.9)

(B.lO)

and
(B.ll)

derived from tpe condition that the marginal product functions are homogeneous of degree
zero in the respective variables, because the production functions are linearly homogeneous.
Substitution of these in equation (B.8) yields

whereEx s
L'

aXL s
as XL

= --

and Ex

~.

axx s
as Xx

s - -17

It follows from equation (B. 12) that the sufficient conditions for dL/dP to be negative in sign

are kx > ky and Ex,.,$ ExcrS"
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FOOTNOTES
1.

The underdeveloped world has been the recipient of superior technology without much

direct foreign investment. See Barnet and Muller [1974].

2.

The technological superiority of the multinationals is embodied in their specific factor.

3.

As correctly pointed out by the referee, in the absence of specific factor in the

importable sector with general rigidity in the real wage, the two-sector, two-factor model
generates a linear transformation curve or constant average cost in each industry. This
framework has its limitations because it leads a trading country to complete specialization.

4.

See Lewis [1954]. Also see Batra and Beladi [1988, 1990] and Yu [1982].

5.

If the multinationals spend a part of their rental for the maintenance of the specific

factor, their net monopoly profit is reduced by this amount. This, however, does not affect
the Net National Product of the host country.

6.

It is interesting to note that all profits accrued to the multinationals are repatriated to

-

the source country, pS

=

-

Xs S is taken out of the country as can be seen in equations (10)

and (14), however, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, the repatriating of profits are not
central to the results.
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7.

Even when the elasticity condition is not satisfied, a sufficiently high capital-labor

ratio in the importable sector will cause a decrease in total employment.
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